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JACKIE KROLOPP KIRN* and MARION E. MARTS**

The Skagit-High Ross Controversy:
Negotiation and Settlement
SETTING AND BACKGROUND
The Skagit River is a short but powerful stream which rises in the
mountains of southwestern British Columbia, cuts through the northern
Cascades in a spectacular and once-remote mountain gorge, and empties
into Puget Sound approximately sixty miles north of Seattle. The beautiful
mountain scenery of the heavily glaciated north Cascades was formally
recognized in the United States by the creation of the North Cascades
National Park and the Ross Lake National Recreation Area in 1968, and
earlier in British Columbia by creation of the E.C. Manning Provincial
Park. The Ross Lake Recreation Area covers the narrow valley of the
upper Skagit River in Washington and portions of several tributary valleys.
It was created as a political and, to environmentalists who wanted national
park status for the entire area, controversial, compromise which accommodated the city of Seattle's Skagit River Project and the then-planned
North Cascades Highway. It separates the national park into two units,
provides the major highway *accessto the park, and is the foreground of
most of the scenic vistas enjoyed by automobile travellers. It was also
the setting of Seattle's controversial proposal to raise the heighf of its
Ross Dam. The settlement of that controversy is the subject of this article.
Seattle City Light (SCL), a municipally owned utility, began construction of its three dam (Gorge, Diablo, and Ross) hydroelectric project on
the Upper Skagit River in 1927. The first two dams plus the existing
Ross Dam have been completed, but the ultimate plan called for raising
Ross Dam by an additional 122.5 feet and the existing dam was constructed so as to accommodate the added height. The existing dam inundates some land in British Columbia; the addition would have increased
the reservoir area in British Columbia nearly ten-fold.'
The addition was approved in 1942 by the International Joint Commission (UC), the agency created by the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909
*Graduate student in geography at the University of Washington. preparing a master's thesis on
the Ross Dam settlement.
"Professor Emeritus of Geography and former Ombudsman. University of Washington.
I. Ross & Marts. The High Ross Dam Project: Environmental Decisions and Changing Environmental Attitudes. 19 CAN. GEoG. 221 (1975). See also P. PrrzER. BUILDING THE SKA..GITr:
A
CENTURY OF UPPER SKAGIT VAL.EY HISTORY 1870-1980 (2d printing. 1978).
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to have jurisdiction over boundary water issues between Canada and the
United States. However, the UC's approval was contingent on Seattle's
reaching an agreement with British Columbia concerning compensation
for the land to be inundated. A tentative agreement reached in 1952 was
not ratified in British Columbia, but an agreement was reached and signed
in 1967. Seattle City Light then proceeded with its plans to construct the
fourth and final stage of Ross Dam (which came to be known as High
Ross Dam), confident that it had the requisite international approval and
contract, and that the additional power was needed. 2
The proposal by Seattle City Light to raise Ross Dam, long-planned
and presumably all arranged, ran into an unexpected storm of controversy
with environmental and eventually international dimensions that was quieted only after the IJC took some extraordinary measures. These measures
led to a negotiated settlement comprising a very interesting package of
trade-offs and long-term commitments that was consummated by a treaty
between Canada and the United States. Settlement was not reached,
however, before the issue had become a cause celebre' in British Columbia, where it symbolized the public's frustration both with the perceived insensitivity of their and Seattle's governments to environmental
values and with Yankee exploitation of their backyard. The controversy
contributed to a change of government in British Columbia and nearly
reached the United States Supreme Court.' Although their legal position
was strong, Seattle City Light's managers were not positioned to cope
with the political and international turbulence triggered by what seemed
to them to be merely a logical and orderly next step in a long-range plan
of developing the hydropower resource of the Skagit River.
The Skagit case demonstrates nicely that resource development planning with long time horizons requires that planners allow for and be
prepared to deal with changing social values, as well as with other contingencies. 6 These factors are especially important in this case because
2. Seattle City Council. Briefing Papers, Ross Chronology (May 1983). See also Perry. The Skagit
Valley Controversy:a Case History of EnvironmenwlPolitics in R. KRUEGER & B. Mrrc-EL.L. MANAGING CANADA'S RENEWABLE RESOURCES (1977).

3. Term applied by Thomas Perry, British Columbian and former Coordinator of the Run Out
Skagit Spoilers committee (ROSS).
4. Swinomish Tribal Community v. FERC, 627 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
5. A general historical overview is available in J. CARROLL. ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY 95
(1983): Perry. supra note 2, Ross & Marts. supra note 1. T. Simmons. The Damnation of a Dam:
The High Ross Dam Controversy (1974) (unpublished Master's thesis, Dept. of Geography. Simon
Fraser University), and U.S. Federal Power Commission. City of Seattle. Project No. 553. Initial
Decision Amending License for Skagit River Ross Development (Feb. 4. 1976). See also Lane.
Ross Dam Fight. U.S. ConservationistsJoin with Canadians.Seattle Times. Oct. 11. 1970 at A16.
col. I.
6. Ross & Marts. supra note 1.
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the development crosses an international boundary and affects the political
tranquility of the neighboring country.
Public utilities, such as Seattle City Light, are particularly vulnerable
to changing social values because they tend to engage in large and longterm programs, and because they are more exposed and accountable to
pluralistic political processes than are private utilities. A private utility
that became embroiled in such a controversy would be more sensitive to
the costs of delay because of higher interest rates on borrowed capital,
and would have been likely to cut its losses quickly and seek an alternative. A federal agency, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
perhaps would have been more influenced by concerns for national and
international comity, concerns which transcend the usual framework of
municipal decisionmaking. Seattle City Light, on the other hand, with
its limited spatial focus and political horizons, exhibited a tenacity verging
on obduracy, protecting not only its sunk investment and the integrity of
its planning, but also its commitments to the Pacific Northwest Power
Pool, and the sacrificed opportunity costs represented by its not having
sought an equivalent alternative in view of its plan for raising Ross Dam.
Thus it held out against environmentalists on both sides of the international
border, and insisted that British Columbia honor the agreement reached
in 1967 or "make Seattle whole" in exchange for Seattle's foregoing
construction of High Ross. 7
The essential elements involved in the case were as follows:
1. A modest additional step in a sixty year program of planning
and development of the river's hydropower resource that involved
inundating additional lands in Canada.'
2. An agreement .between Seattle and British Columbia (1967)'
sanctioned by an order (1942) of the UC;' °
3. An unforeseen change in environmental values which was rein7. International Joint Commission. in the Matter of the Application of the City of Seattle for
Authority to Raise the Water Level of the Skagit River approximately 130 feet at the International
Boundary between the United States and Canada. Statement in Reply of the Province of British
Columbia to Statements in Response to the Request in the Application Made by the Province of
British Columbia. (Feb. 6. 1981) [hereinafter cited as B.C. Statement in Reply]. (Chronology at 7.
and Appendix. British Columbia-Seattle Negotiations. Pertinent Correspondence at 21) [hereinafter
cited as Pertinent Correspondence].
8. Ross & Marts. supra note 1.
9. Agreement between British Columbia and the City of Seattle (Jan. 10. 1967) [hereinafter cited
as 1967 Agreement]. The full text of this Agreement appears in Before the Federal Power Commission.
Application for Amendment of License. Skagit River-Ross Development. Project No. 553-Washington. By the City of Seattle. Washington. Exhibit F (Oct. 1970).
10. International Joint Commission. Order of Approval in the Matter of the City of Seattle for
Authority to Raise the Water Level of the Skagit River approximately 130 feet at the International
Boundary between the United States and Canada (Jan. 27. 1942) [hereinafter cited as 1942 Order].
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forced by other Canadian frustrations in dealing with the United
States and also by British Columbians' frustrations in dealing with
their own provincial government, leading to the case becoming a
national issue in Canada but only a localized issue in the United
States: " and
4. A negotiated solution signed in 1984 only after the controversy
had festered for some fourteen years. 12 This solution was made possible largely by another unanticipated change in the planning environment: recognition of surplus generating capacity in British
Columbia. "

Thus. the case is an excellent example of the importance of anticipating
shifting social values. It also raises the question of how well the architects
of this agreement have anticipated future shifts in the social and economic
values of natural resources.
Short History of the Controversy

As noted, the High Ross Dam proposal was an integral part of Seattle's
staged development of the Skagit River, built to serve as the upstream
storage reservoir to maximize electrical output of the three-dam system.
It also provides some flood control for the lower Skagit Valley. The initial
stages were constructed so as to accommodate the fourth step relatively
inexpensively. The third stage extended the reservoir.into Canada, in-

undating approximately 500 acres in British Columbia at full pool. This
area was never cleared and groomed properly, in the expectation that it
would be inundated when the fourth stage was completed. The Skagit

Project is a major component of Seattle's electrical supply system. but
Seattle does own other generating resources, including Boundary Dam
in northeastern Washington on the Pend Oreille River, which played a
role in the final agreement, discussed later.' 4
11.Perr. Hex; this land is your land. too. 93 MACLEAN'S 6 (Dec. 8. 1980): CARROLL. supra
note 5. at 95: and Gray. A Wilderness Preserved. 96 MACLEAN'S 32 (Apr. 11.1983).
12. British Columbia-Seattle Agreement. Annex at 5 in Treaty with Canada Relating to the Skagit
River and Ross Lake in the State of Washington. and the Seven Mile Reservoir on the Pend d'Oreille
River in the Province of British Columbia. Apr. 2. 1984. United States-Canada. Senate Treaty Doc.
98-26 [hereinafter cited as Treaty]. The Agreement was signed March 30. 1984. and includes five
appendices [hereinafter cited as Agreement].
13. The rapid reversal from forecasting deficits to acknowledging surplus of electric power is an
amazing chapter in the history of Pacific Northwest electricity planning. and is generously documented. See. e.g.. DEPT. OF ENERGY, BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION. POWER OUTLOOK. MAY
1980 THROUGH 1990-91 (1980) compared with DEPT. OF ENERGY. BONNEVUL.E POWER ADMINISTRATION. BONNEvuIE POWER ADMINISTRATION 1982 PROGRAM AND FINANCIAL SUMMARY (March 1983).

See also H ydro Claims on Surplus Power Hit. Vancouver Sun. Nov. 26. 1981. at A19. col. 1. and
Alice in Hvdroland. Vancouver Sun. Nov. 26. 1981. at A4. col. I (editorial). For later discussions
of the power surplus situation in British Columbia. see Fox, Dam Cost is Crippling. Vancouver
Sun. Apr. I1.1983. at AS. col. 1. and Connelly. Conservation Works so Well B.C. Has Extra
ElectricitY and Erases Big Dam Plans. Seattle Post-Intelligencer. Sept. 26. 1983. at B9. col. 1.
14. Perry. supra note 2. See also PrrzER. supra note 1: Agreement. supra note 12.
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Seattle's development had converted the spectacular and remote gorge
into a readily accessible "stairway" of three dams and reservoirs, and
SCL's "Skagit Tours" became a popular tourist attraction. Thousands of
tourists had seen the "waffle face" of the existing dam, so designed to
ensure proper bonding of the concrete that would be needed for the fourth
stage.
Seattle's plan for the fourth and final stage called for increasing the
height of the 540-foot dam by 122.5 feet, to an elevation of 1,725 feet
above sea level. This would extend the reservoir an additional seven miles
into Canada and inundate an additional 4,720 acres of Canadian land
when the reservoir was full. " The enlargement would increase substantially the peaking power capacity of the Skagit Project and reduce Seattle's
dependence on Bonneville Power Administration's relatively expensive
peaking power. The increase in energy provided by the enlargement would
have been much more modest. This differential in the output of the project
increased SCL's difficulty in explaining the project to opponents, many
of whom were not familiar with power managers' distinctions between
"capacity" and "energy," and the relative value of each. At the time of
the initial planning, little consideration was given to environmental values, except those associated with fish and wildlife.' 6
In 1942 the UC approved the fourth High Ross stage subject to a
compensation agreement with British Columbia. As noted, that agreement
was reached with the Social Credit government of Premier W.A.C. Bennett in 1967.' ' The agreement covered a 99-year period, with Seattle to
make annual payments of $34,566 either in cash or in equivalent .power
valued at 3.75 mills per kilowatt hour, plus taxes on the reservoir land.

Throughout the long period of stalemate that followed 1967, Seattle paid
the annual rental and taxes. But after Bennett's Social Credit government
was replaced in 1972, British Columbia repudiated the agreement and
ceased accepting Seattle's payments.'
Prior to the late 1960s, residents of both Washington and British Columbia had voiced little if any oposition to the dams. Indeed, the twentytwo mile long Ross Lake, accessible by rough road at the Canadian end
and by boat at the Ross Dam end, became popular for boating and fishing.
There were, however, objections to the unsightly 'stump farm" and

mudflats exposed at the Canadian end whenever the reservoir was drawn
down, which was its typical autumn and winter condition. and also to
15.Gordon & Berry. Report to International Joint Commission re: Ross Dam 10 (Apr. 2. 1982).

16. See. e.g.. Before the Federal Power Commission. Application for Amendment of License.
Skagit River-Ross Development. Project No. 553-Washington. By the City of Seattle. Washington.
October 1970. The Environmental Statement submitted February 1971 as part of this Application
was only 25 pages in length. See also. Pertinent Correspondence. supra note 7.
17. 1967 Agreement. supra note 9.
18. Perry. supra note 2. at249.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

the loss of stream fishing at the north end of the reservoir. Early in 1970.
the British Columbia government announced plans for a new 3,700-acre
provincial park and 32,900-acre recreation area in the Skagit Valley to
take advantage of the proposed enlargement of the reservoir.' 9
By 1969, however, the environmenfal movement had gained strength.
Opposition to High Ross began to crystallize on both sides of the border,
spearheaded by the Sierra Club, the North Cascades Conservation Council
(N3C), and a new group in Canada known as ROSS (Run Out Skagit
Spoilers), a coalition of established British Columbian environmental
organizations which coalesced around the High Ross issue. Concerns of
U.S. environmentalists focused largely on inundation of tributary valleys
which provided scenic hiking access to the North Cascades, particularly
Big Beaver Valley. Canadians objected especially to the loss of additional
free-flowing Skagit River and the streamfishing it provided, and the low
annual rental tendered by Seattle to British Columbia.' By October 1970,
when Seattle applied to the Federal Power Commission (FPC), later
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), for a High Ross license,
the debate had developed into a confrontation. Opposition was expressed
in both the British Columbia Legislature and the Canadian Parliament,
and, as noted, the Social Credit government was overturned in 1972. "1
British Columbia in 1974 requested the UC to reconsider the 1942 decision.' Meanwhile, the Washington State Ecology Commission and the
Washington Department of Ecology expressed opposition to the project,
but were unable to halt it, and the requisite state water permit was granted
by the Department of Ecology.' With two new members the Seattle City
Council, which had approved submission of the application to the FPC
in 1970, recognized the growing opposition by reopening hearings but
reaffirmed its approval.24
During the latter half of the 1970s, Seattle and British Columbia sought
to reach a negotiated settlement that would involve a irade of power from
one or more specific power sites in British Columbia (e.g., installation
of another generating unit at Mica Dam on the upper Columbia River)
in exchange for Seattle's agreeing to forego construction of High Ross.
19. Ross & Marts. supra note 1. at 223.
20. Perry, supra note 2. at 240. See also T. PRRY, A CmTZEN's Gum To THE SKAGrr VALLEY
(1981).
21. Perry. supra note 20.

22. Province of British Columbia. Request in the Application, in the Matter of the Application
of the City of Seattle for Authority to Raise the Water Level of the Skagit River Approximately 130
Feet at the International Boundary Between the United States and Canada (June 25, 1974) [hereinafter
cited as 1974 Request].
2j. Seattle Times, March 18. 1971. at B7. col. 3. See also Lane. State 'no's' camouflaged High
Ross 'yes'. Seattle Times. Mar. 13. 1974, at B2. col. 3.
24. Ross & Marts. supra note 1.at 224.
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These negotiations broke down over technical issues involving the kinds
of power that might be traded (peaking, firm, secondary) for the High
Ross capability, and the relative value of the power. given differences
between the two countries in exchange rates, construction costs, and
financing costs. Seattle perceived British Columbia's promise to provide
power to be much less secure than having High Ross Dam on U.S. soil.
It appears also that both sides had strong expectations of "winning" in
other arenas and were not prepared to make substantial concessions. The
negotiations were completely broken off in August 1980. Whatever the
reasons, it appears that both parties shared the belief that all the ground
had been covered and an acceptable negotiated settlement was simply not
feasible. These negotiation efforts, however, did help define the issues.'
Meanwhile, Seattle's position was strengthened when, in 1977, the
Federal Power Commission approved the construction of High Ross, and
the UC dismissed, though without prejudice, British Columbia's 1974
request to annul the 1942 Order. Opponents challenged the FPC license
on environmental grounds, including the effects that operation of High
Ross would have on the fishery resources downstream. 6 The U.S. Court
of Appeals rejected this appeal in July 1980. with one judge dissenting,
and the rejection was not appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 7 In August
1980, British Columbia again appealed to the UC to set the 1942 Order
aside.' Opposition by the environmental community and Canadians in
general continued unabated, and Seattle was perceived as uncaring and
intransigent.
The Dilemma
As things stood in late 1980s, the case appeared to be in a stalemate.
25. B.C. Statement in Reply, supra note 7.
26. There are important salmon and steelhead spawning grounds downstream from Gorge Dam.
Manipulation of streamflow incident to power operations creates problems of cold water. stranding.
dewatering of eggs. and silting of spawning beds. SCL asserted throughout that High Ross would
not worsen the existing situation. but opponents were skeptical. Although planned as asystem. there
is an hydraulic imbalance between Ross and the two downstream dams. At full operation. Ross
passes approximately twice the water that can be used by Diablo and Gorge power plants and there
is inadequate storage capacity in their pools to store the excess water. Thus. full operation of the
Ross powerhouse for any sustained period leads to."spills'" (water not used for generating electricity)
at Diablo and Gorge. This situation led opponents to suspect that construction of High Ross would
lead Seattle to construct a dam at the Copper Creek site. downstearn from Gorge. as a reregulating
project. A Copper Creek Dam would have eliminated approximately eleven additional miles of river.
now used for spawning. In April 1981. Seattle subsequently withdrew from further consideration
the construction of Copper Creek Dam. so this aspect of the downstream problem is moot. See
SEATTL'.E
CI'Y LIGHT. COPPER CREEK UPDATE (No. 10. July 1981) (public information newsletter).
27. Swinomish Tribal Community. supra note 4.
28. Province of British Columbia Request in the Application. In the Matter of the Application of
the City of Seattle to Raise the Water Level of the Skagit River Approximately 130 Feet at the
International Boundary Between the United States and Canada (Aug. 14. 1980).
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Both sides believed their positions would prevail. Seattle felt its legal
position was unassailable. The 1942 Order and the 1967 agreement had
been upheld by the IJC. the Federal Power Commission had granted the
license, the opponents' appeal to the courts had failed, and Seattle had
invested substantial sums in engineering and planning studies and, perhaps
prematurely, in building the existing dam to accommodate the additional
stage. On the other hand, British Columbia knew that Seattle's proceeding
with construction would be a "hostile" act against both a friendly neighbor
and the environmental community.
The political reality for British Columbia was two-faceted. It was
unacceptable to its constituents to allow the dam to be raised. yet it was
also unacceptable to repudiate the 1967 agreement unilaterally without
adequate restitution to Seattle. British Columbia had hopes that its second
appeal to the UC would prevail. Failing that, there was always the chance
that intervention by one or both federal governments might extricate the
province from its uncomfortable position.
It was unacceptable to the UC to rescind the 1942 decision arbitrarily.
The Commission wished to ensure that any resolution would be both
equitable and durable. It also was concerned with the precedents it might
establish in reopening a longstanding and legally intact order and caving
in to the persistent stonewalling by one party. - At the same time. environmentalists in both Washington State and British Columbia remained
adamant in their opposition to the project. and politicians on both sides
of the border were aware of the inherent political costs-for those in
Seattle, the costs of proceeding with the project. and for those in British
Columbia. the costs of honoring the 1967 agreement.'
The dilemma seemed intractable; it appeared that only a "win-lose"
solution could be reached whether the IC responded to British Columbia's second appeal favorably or unfavorably. The long period of confrontation, review, licensing, reexamination, political maneuvering, and
negotiation had not produced a mutually agreeable "'win-win" solution;
indeed, a win-win solution seemed impossible. However, things were
about to change, beginning in 1981 with five new appointments to the
UIC following two Canadian resignations and replacement of the entire
U.S.
by the environment
new administration
of President
TheSection
new political
in Washington,
D.C..Reagan."
and the presence
29. Personal interview, J.K.K. with David LaRoche. Secretary of the U.S. Section. tIC. April
15. 1984.
30. Id. Also. personal interviews. J.K.K. with B. Marr. Deputy Minister of the Environment and
British Columbia representative on the Joint Consultative Group. infra note 49 (Sept. I. 1983). and
Bob Royer. former Deputy Mayor of Seattle and representative on the Joint Consultative Group
(May 25. 1983 and Apr. 5. 1984).
31, Seattle Times. Mar. II. 1981 at DI. col. I: Vancouver Sun. Mar. 17. 1982 at B7. col. I.
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of the new U.S. commissioners with high level political access, may
have contributed to the Commission's willingness to take new initiatives.
Certainly the infusion of new personalities, individuals unburdened by
the dispute's long and frustrating history, helped produce a fresh approach
to the dilemma. 32 In any case, the new Commission was about to lay the
groundwork for breaking out of the dilemma.
BREAKOUT FROM IMPASSE
In addressing British Columbia's 1980 Request, the UC took an imaginative departure from the rather narrow, legalistic assessment of the
merits of the request and its background. Instead, the Commission adopted
a much broader view, emphasizing the general dispute resolution intent
of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty.3" Also, recognizing that there were
various actors with disparate but valid interests in the outcome, the Commission broadened the participation and adopted the concept that only a
mutually satisfactory solution would be acceptable. The UC's agenda,
then, changed from adjudicating an awkward controversy to designing a
strategy to achieve a mutually acceptable solution. Moreover, the UC's
initiatives raised the Ross Dam case from what. in the larger view, was
a modest project with localized impacts to a textbook example of international conflict resolution. '
An important first step was the appointment of a team of special advisors, Douglas J. Gordon and George T. Berry, with impeccable credentials for expertise and impartiality, to work with the advisors 4o the
Commission." These special advisors arbitrated the data base. and the
complex technical issues pertaining to costs and output of High Ross and
of the most likely British Columbia alternatives for providing equivalent
power to Seattle. The difficulties of estimating and gaining agreement on
these points should not be underestimated. The output of a complex
hydropower project such as Ross Dam and the two related downstream
plants depends on many factors, including the amount and timing of
precipitation and runoff: the operation of the powerplant in the Skagit
River system and in Seattle's total generating system: and the shape of
Seattle's electricity load curve and the possibility of selling surplus output
to other utilities. Related with these factors are the kinds of .output that
32. LaRoche interview. supra note 29. and Royer interview. May 25. 1983. supra note 30. See
also Vancouver Sun. supra note 31.
33. Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising between the United States and
Canada. Jan. II. 1909. United States-Great Britain. 36 Stat. 2448. T.S. No. 548. opening paragraph.
34. H. RAiFFA. THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 1982): R. FisHER & W. URY. GEFrING TO

YEs.

NEGOTIATING AGREEME"NT WITHour" GIVING IN (1981).

35. Mr. Gordon and Mr. Berry were recently retired chief executive officers of Ontario Hydro
and The Power Authority of the State of New York. respectively.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

fVol. 26

are physically producible: capacity to meet short-term or sustained peak
demands, average firm energy, and marketable secondary energy. All of
these factors must be considered over time, that is, over the life of the
project. Such issues had contributed to breakdown of the earlier, bilateral
negotiations. The progress toward agreement on the complex technical
issues facilitated by the Gordon/Berry Report was a notable achievement. 3
Another important step taken by the IJC was to bring the contending
parties back into negotiating mode. This required shaking the. confidence
of both parties in achieving an ultimate victory at the expense of the
other. In December 1981 the UC paid a visit to British Columbia to
convey the message that it "should not make the mistake of simply
assuming that [the Commission] would go through the regular drill in
processing the province's request and they would certainly make a grave
error in assuming the Commission would rule positively on that request."
The UC then delivered a similar message in Seattle, to the effect that
"any idea that they could under present circumstances willy-nilly construct the dam, regardless of what they thought their authority to be, was
a pipe dream, that they had better ground themselves in reality and realize
that it wasn't going to be quite that easy. And, they had no way to
guarantee that [the Commission] would dismiss British Columbia's request. 3'
Both Seattle and British Columbia were told that they should start anew
looking for a way to come to some kind of agreement. The response of
the contending parties was unenthusiastic. The long and unsuccessful
period of bilateral negotiations (1974 to 1980) had left both parties frustrated and mistrustful. '
Then, a few weeks later, the Commission convened the parties in the
IC's Washington, D.C. office and made it clear "that the two could no
longer sit idly waiting for something to happen," and that they were
expected to reach an agreement.3 9 In short, the responsibility was put
squarely on Seattle and British Columbia; the UC showed no intention
of extricating them from the dilemma. The UC also gave the parties a
preview of the Supplementary Order, to be issued shortly, and told them
that the UC found British Columbia's request "without merit" but was
not dismissing it, and that one year would be allowed for reaching a
36. Gordon & Berry. supra note 15. at 6.

37. LaRoche interview, supra note 29.

38. Id.: interviews with Mart and Royet. supra note 30. See also Pertinent Correspondence.
supra note 7.

39. LaRoche interview. supra note 29.
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settlement. Both parties were made to feel at risk, facing the possibility
that either one could lose outright.'
In February 1982 the Commission requested a report from the special
advisors to cover "determination of agreed figures and formulas to assess
the benefits which Seattle will forego" by not building High Ross, and
"determination of a preferred mechanism for implementing alternative
means" to provide Seattle with equivalent benefits." This report, dated
April 12, 1982, verified the benefits and costs of High Ross to Seattle,
eliminated certain alternatives from consideration because of costs or
poor match with High Ross, and identified promising alternatives, namely
raising Seven Mile Dam and adding a fifth generator at Mica Dam.4
These alternatives had been considered in the earlier negotiations between
Seattle and British Columbia, but the Gordon/Berry Report lent them
added credibility. The report established the technical and economic feasibility of the "paper dam" concept, and arbitrated the data base, providing a set of economic and technical assumptions and conclusions which
had earlier been in dispute. "3 Interestingly, a similar "paper dam" concept-a contract agreement-whereby Seattle would pay British Columbia the costs of building and operating High Ross, and British Columbia
would provide power equivalent to High Ross in exchange, had been
proposed in the earlier negotiations."
Having set the stage for renewal of negotiations and armed with the
analyses provided by the expert advisors, the LIC issued the Supplementary Order on April 28, 1982.' s In the Order the Commission addressed
both policy and procedure. It declined to grant British Columbia the relief
sought in the 1980 Request, saying that the arguments presented "do not
constitute sufficient grounds to persuade [the Commission] to exercise its
jurisdiction."' The Commission referred to its responsibility to prevent
disputes, ordered Seattle to maintain Ross Dam at its existing height for
one year, and stated that the Canadian Skagit Valley should not be flooded
40. The details of the events preceding issuance of the Supplementary Order are from interviews
with LaRoche. id.. Mart and Royer. supra note 30. and also a short conversation with Geoffrey
Thornburn. Secretary of the Canadian Section, UC (Aug. 4. 1983).
41. Gordon & Berry. supra note 15. at 3.
42. Id. at 30.
43. Id. at 3.
44. Pertinent Correspondence. supra note 7.
45. International Joint Commission. In the Matter of the Application of the City of Seattle for
Authority to Raise the Water Level of the Skagit River approximately 130 Feet at the International
Boundary between the United States and Canada. Supplementary Order. Ottawa. Ontario (Apr. 28.
1982). reprimed in CARROLL. supra note 5. as Appendix 6 at 370 [hereinafter cited as 1982 Supp.
Order].
46. Id. at 371.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

beyond the current level provided that Seattle receives "appropriate compensation in the form of money, energy, or any other means .. .for the
loss of a valuable and reliable source of power."" 7 The order pointed out
that the UC was not obligated to make a final resolution, but would retain
jurisdiction. It indicated that the Commission reserved the right to "make
such further Order or Orders . . . as may be necessary.""
The procedural step was to announce that the Commission would appoint a Special Board composed of two members of the Commission and
two non-governmental experts, and would invite the two federal governments, the Province of British Columbia and the City of Seattle, each to
nominate a representative to be a member of the Board. The Board was
to coordinate, facilitate, and review on a continuing basis the negotiation
and implementation of a mutually acceptable agreement. A forcing provision was that the Special Board was to provide status reports to the
Commission every four months regarding progress. 9
The composition of the Board was important. It was recognized from
the outset that a treaty would be necessary as well as other implementing
measures, including an agreement between British Columbia and Canada,
that were beyond the authority of either the province or the city. The
participation of the federal representatives was important .to ensure the
necessary cooperation of the variety of entities that would be involved
in the implementing measures and guarantees at the federal level. It is
significant that this was the first time the federal governments were represented at the High Ross negotiating table, giving the parties assurance
that the federal governments were committed to reaching and implementing a solution. The federal and Commission representatives on the
Board also implied a "policing" presence.
In summary, the IJC had deferred the final decision. returned the parties
to the negotiating table with a firm deadline in the presence of and with
the support of federal authority, and exerted pressure to ensure a good
faith negotiation. Through the Gordon/Berry Report, the UC provided an
authoritative informational basis for resolving the many technical difficulties in calculating the costs and benefits of High Ross and of an
equivalent alternative. In the same stroke, the IJC discomfited the parties
with the awareness that they could lose the entire game if an agreement
had not been reached during the grace period.
The package proved to be a bold and effective set of initiatives; however, belief that the process had a chance of succeeding required -an act
47. Id.
48. Id. at 372.
49. Id.: later renamed Joint Consultative Group to emphasize that it was an advisory rather than
a decisionmaking entity.
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of faith by the UC and by the participants. The process nearly broke
down on several occasions during the one-year negotiation period. Repeatedly the UC reminded the parties that they had to make some sacrifices, that there was "only one way out," and that both were responsible
for the higher interests of both countries."
There is no public record of the negotiation proceedings. The available
record is only partial and is based on recollections and anecdotal accounts
of participants. After several meetings of the Joint Consultative Group,
and as a result of commitment, hard work, faith, and possibly also luck,
Seattle Mayor Charles Royer and British Columbia Premier William Bennett jointly released a "framework agreement" in April 1983. ' This was
followed by drafting of an agreement between Canada and British Columbia 2
and of a treaty between Canada and the United States. After some further
refinement of details, the final Agreement was completed on March 30,
1984, ending
a corrosive controversy that had persisted for more than a
.3

decade

THE AGREEMENT AND THE TREATY
The Agreement between British Columbia and Seattle is a complex
document with many intricacies covering a variety of contingencies. The
following discussion is a substantial simplification. The four essential
components are: 1)an energy contract (the "paper dam." as it came to
be known); 2) a termination option; 3) an environmental endowment fund;
and 4) the implementing treaty. The key element of the Agreement, of
course, was the energy contract.'
The PaperDam
The basis of the British Columbia-Seattle Agreement is the principle
that Seattle would forego building High Ross if the parties could find a
way, at no additional cost to Seattle, to substitute similar resources for
those Seattle was entitled to by the 1942 Order and the 1967 contract.
After the UC issued the 1982 Supplementary Order, British Columbia
and Seattle set out together to build the dam not of concrete, but of paper.
In the resulting contract, Seattle agreed to pay British Columbia the
estimated cost of constructing, financing, and operating High Ross." In
50. LaRoche interview. supra note 29.
5I. Province of British Columbia Ministry of Environment and City of Seattle Office of the Mayor
Joint News Release. Skagit Details Released. (Apr. 14. 1983).
52. Canada-British Columbia Agreement (unsigned copy dated Dec. 8. 1983. inauthor's lile).
53. Agreement. supra note 12.
54. Overlying the Agreement. supra note 12. is the Treaty. supra note 12. The two are highly
interrelated: comments made in discussing one may also pertain to the other.
55. Agreement. supra note 12. §5 at 7.
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return. British Columbia agreed to supply Seattle with the estimated
equivalent electrical output of High Ross.'
The term of the agreement is eighty years, from 1986 to 2066.-' This
is based on the remainder of Seattle's 99-year entitlqment to the High
Ross reservoir under the terms of the 1967 compensation contract. The
agreement also reflects the fact that most of the delay since 1967 occurred
in the United States as a result of licensing procedures, environmental
studies, and legal challenges. In addition, it acknowledges the assumption
that if Seattle began High Ross construction in early 1983, power generation would be expected to begin in January 1986. This, then, is the
date of first power delivery to Seattle under the Agreement. 5
The contract required Seattle to pay British Columbia $21,848,000
(U.S.) annually for 35 years." This payment schedule is the same that
Seattle would have followed had it borrowed the money necessary to
finance High Ross construction. It was assumed that Seattle would have
issued bonds covering the $208 million capital cost at an interest rate of
10.127 percent, the rate Seattle actually paid on an entirely separate bond
issue in December 1982.' Seattle will also pay British Columbia an
annual operation and maintenance charge throughout the 80-year contract
period. This payment will be $100,000 (U.S.) in the first year, and
thereafter will be adjusted annually according to changes in the U.S.
Consumer Price Index." '
In return, British Columbia will provide 37.3 average megawatts of
firm energy on a seasonal schedule similar to that which High Ross would
have produced, and must cover the transmission costs to deliver the power
to Seattle because Seattle could have transmitted the High Ross output
over its existing transmission lines.' In addition, British Columbia will
provide peaking capacity as follows: 150 megawatts from April through
October, and 532 megawatts less actual production of existing Ross Dam
from November through March.'
If British Columbia defaults on this obligation, Seattle may gain access
to other British Columbia power, for example, a portion of British Columbia's power entitlement under the Columbia River Treaty. This is
56. Id. § 4 at 7. It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze the technical bases for the power
and cost calculations. The authors accept the figures established in the Agreement which, in turn.
are based on the Gordon & Berry Report with some modifications.

57. Id. §2 at 6.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
1985.
63.

Id. § 4 at 7. See also Seattle City Council. Briefing Papers. supra note 2.
Agreement. supra note 12.
Seattle City Council. Briefing Paper, supra note 2. at Tab. 3.
Agreement. supra note 12. §5 at 7.
Personal interview. J.K.K. with Ray Nelson. Power Manager, Seattle City Light, Feb. 28.
Agreement. supra note 12. §4 at 7.
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British Columbia power generated at United States dams using releases
from storage reservoirs built in Canada under terms of the Columbia
River Treaty.'
British Columbia also is permitted to raise the reservoir level behind
its Seven Mile Dam on the Pend Oreille River an additional 15 feet,
which will allow B.C. Hydro to produce a significant portion (about half
the average annual energy though a lesser amount of the capacity) of the
power it must deliver to Seattle.' Raising the Seven Mile Reservoir will
result in less than 200 acres of additional flooding; approximately threequarters of this will occur in British Columbia. At normal full pool, a
maximum of fifty acres will be flooded in Washington State, fortuitously
on property owned by Seattle downstream from Seattle City Light's
Boundary Dam.' British Columbia will compensate SCL for losses in
power generation at Boundary Dam resulting from tailwater encroachment
caused by the higher Seven Mile Reservoir.6' Seattle agreed to cede its
land holdings in the Canadian Skagit Valley back to the province." This
was land which had been purchased in 1929 from private owners.
Further, both parties agreed to create an Environmental Endowment
Fund to repair and enhance the environment surrounding the existing
Ross Reservoir and improve public access to the area. If feasible. Manning
Provincial Park in British Columbia may be linked with the North Cascades National Park on the United States side of the border by a trail
system. The fund is to reach $5 million (U.S.) in four years, with Seattle
contributing eighty percent. Over a ten year period. the majority of the
expenditures are to be made in British Columbia. In part, these differentials reflect the damage to the environment caused by the existing Ross
Reservoir. Both Seattle and British Columbia will supplement the fund
with a surcharge on the energy each receives from the Agreement. This
surcharge is not to exceed twenty cents per megawatt hour. An Environmental Endowment Commission comprising four representatives appointed by the Premier of British Columbia and four by the Mayor of
Seattle will administer the fund and develop plans and programs for the
area.6

The Agreement spells out procedures for resolving disputes which
might arise in operating the "'paper dam." a consulting board for low
64. Treaty with Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of the
Columbia River Basin. United States and Canada (Jan. 17. 1961) (eff. 1964). An. IV and V. 15
U.S.T. 1555. Pt. 2. T.I.A.S. No. 5638: and Agreement. supra note 12. §9-D-(i) at 10.
65. Agreement. supra note 12. §7 at 8: Gordon & Berry. supra note 15. at 36.
66. Seattle City Council. Briefing Papers. The Proposed High Ross Settlement: Seattle and British
Columbia Perspectives 4 (1983).
67. Agreement. supra note 12.
68. Id. at § 12 at I!.
69. Id. at § I I at II & App. D at 38. Author J.K.K. is an altemate member of the Commission.
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level disputes, and an arbitration tribunal for more serious matters.7" The
Agreement requires the two parties to meet at least once every ten years
to review possibly mutually beneficial changes in the Agreement. 7 '
Seattle and British Columbia agreed to have the UC dispose of the.
1942 Order. 72 In doing so. the parties consented to abolishment of Seattle's
original claim to High Ross. while replacing it with a completely new

set of rights and conditions under the Agreement and Treaty.
The Termination Option
After 1991, either party may terminate the paper dam according to the
procedure laid out in the Agreement. Either party may unilaterally initiate
a termination by giving a formal notice of its intent. This notice triggers
a one-year review period during which the notifying party may unilaterally
withdraw its notice. If it is not withdrawn, a five-year notice period
commences and can be withdrawn only by consent of both parties. Once
the full five-year notice period elapses. the energy contract is terminated.
The two parties may mutually agree to an earlier termination.
If Seattle terminates the paper dam, it simply ceases its obligation to
make capital, operation, and maintenance payments to British Columbia
and forfeits all interest in the energy deliveries and any future claim to
High Ross.74 If British Columbia terminates the paper dam. matters are
much more complicated. In this case. Seattle receives the unconditional
right to immediately construct High Ross Dam and raise Ross Reservoir
the additional 122.5 feet. Seattle retains this right for the duration of the
Agreement, until 2066. If Seattle chooses to raise Ross Dam, British
Columbia would have to pay Seattle the lesser of the project construction
costs or a sum sufficient to acquire equivalent electrical power less the
value of Seattle's remaining scheduled capital payments. If British Columbia commits a material breach of the contract, it may lose its right
to the higher Seven Mile Reservoir. 7
If Seattle declines to build High Ross immediately, then British Columbia must still reimburse the city in the same manner. This least-cost
provision anticipates the possibility of less expensive resources becoming
available at some future time, for instance in the
76 event that a new and
lower cost'generating technology is developed.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

§ 10 at 10.
§8 at 8.
§2 at 6.
§9 at 8.

at §9 at 10.
at §9 at 9.
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The Treaty
The Treaty is the Agreement's implementing instrument.' Had it not
been ratified, the British Columbia-Seattle Agreement would have been
called off. The Treaty establishes one of the most important features of
the arrangement, the federal guarantees. The Treaty directs the federal
governments to "endeavor to ensure" that the parties fulfill their obligations under the Agreement, and should either party fail, the respective
federal government is responsible for meeting all of that party's obligations.78
The federal securities are of great importance to the parties, particularly
to Seattle, as British Columbia's word was considered suspect because
the 1967 contract had not been honored. The Treaty defines the authorizations and conditions for operation of Ross and Seven Mile Reservoirs
at the international boundary. It makes explicit Seattle's claim to High
Ross if British Columbia terminates the paper dam. 79 In a sense, the
Treaty is the enforcing mechanism in that it guarantees the various sanctions.
The Treaty establishes the authorizations for operating the reservoirs
on the Skagit and Pend Oreille Rivers, requiring no further action by the
IUC.' It sanctions all the commitments made under the agreement. and
establishes the superordinate authority to enforce those commitments." '
It creates an immunity for Seattle's conditional claim (in the event of
a British Columbian termination) to High Ross from any potential rulings,
orders. or legislation by any government entity in the United States or
Canada which would interfere with that right.12 It requires Canada to
modify its electrical export policies to permit British Columbia's longterm export contract."3 This form of federal involvement, absent in the
previous negotiation attempt, is a crucial factor in explaining the success
of the 1982-83 negotiation effort.
The basic framework of the Treaty was formulated under the direction
of the Joint Consultative Group. simultaneous with development of the
Agreement. during the 1982-83 negotiation process. Subsequently, other
implementing arrangements had to be made between the parties and their
respective federal governments which validated the "federal securities"
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Treaty. supra note 12. Id. Art. IV at 3.
See id. Art. II and III at 2.
See id.Art. Ifat 2.
See supra note 78.
Treaty. supra note 12. Art II at 2.
Id.
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mechanisms. In the United States, this process proved to be far from
automatic .84
The UC had to coordinate with U.S. federal agencies which had not
previously been involved in drafting the Agreement and Treaty. These
agencies stood to gain very little from the conflict resolution, but their
concurrence was essential. They were the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA); its parent, the Department of Energy; the Treasury Department; and the Office of Management and Budget.
BPA found itself in an awkward position because it wished to avoid
the appearance of sanctioning the importation of low cost power from
British Columbia while it was also struggling to adjust to the unanticipated
power surplus in the Pacific Northwest. Understandably, BPA showed
little or no interest in supporting the proposed Treaty and since BPA is
an agency of the U.S. Department of Energy, whose support was required
as a practical matter, ratification by the United States was, for a time, in
doubt.
Another issue posed by the Treaty concerned the establishment of the
federal guarantee mechanism. Seattle insisted on a Canadian federal guarantee of British Columbia's obligations, leading Canada to seek a reciprocal guarantee by the United States. This required that the U.S. Treasury
Department participate as guarantor of Seattle's financial obligations, a
difficulty because Reagan administration policies sought to restrict federal
involvement in state and municipal affairs.
In both instances United States LIC Commissioner L. Keith Bulen
personally interceded at the top levels of government to enlist U.S. agency
cooperation in the final stages of Treaty creation. His success underscores
the importance of personal and political influence in securing the support
of peripheral actors who had not had the opportunity to "buy into" the
negotiated settlement, and who might actually incur some sacrifices from
it.
ANALYSIS
Several factors contributed to the success of the 1982-83 negotiations:
the conflict-resolution approach taken by the IJC, changes in both the
political and economic environments, the skill of the participants, and
certain elements designed into the Agreement. These elements provide
equity, flexibility, and security to the two parties. Ironically, the third
party, the environment, is less well provided for.
Equity
Equity stems from the Agreement's fundamental principle of making
84. This and the following four paragraphs are based largely on the LaRoche interview. supra
note 29. and subsequent telephone communication of Sept. 18. 1985.

Spring 1986]

THE SKAGIT-HIGH ROSS DAM CONTROVERSY

Seattle whole at the same cost as High Ross and without building High
Ross. The Agreement respected Seattle's property right in High Ross by
virtue of the 1942 Order and 1967 contract, and on the other hand preserved the Canadian Skagit Valley from further inundation. This principle
not only laid the basis for a feasible solution, but it was also a politically
appealing concept, perceived as providing "honor and equity for all
concerned. "' British Columbia escaped from the onerous 1967 contract,
Seattle could not reasonably expect anything more than a High Ross
equivalent, and the UC was freed from the prospect of having to make
a unilateral decision which could not avoid being unpopular with one
party or the other. The principle served as a standard of fairness in
apportioning costs and benefits and aided in resolving the many complex
technical and economic issues that had to be addressed in framing the
Agreement.
Equity to the environment is more ambiguous, and involves two aspects. One aspect is that the Agreement does not guarantee that Ross
Reservoir will not be raised and the Canadian Skagit Valley further inundated. Indeed, the Agreement guarantees Seattle that option if British
Columbia terminates the Agreement before it has run its full 80-year
term. However, the equity here is that the destiny of the Canadian Skagit
is entirely under the control of British Columbia, which is reassuring to
enviromentalists, who perceived the province as having become defender
of the Skagit.
The other and negative aspect of the environmental question is that the
environmental damage that might have been caused to the Canadian Skagit
Valley has been relocated and spread ("regionalized") over the entire
B.C. Hydro system, and perhaps with impacts on the Columbia River
with which the B.C. Hydro system is hydraulically integrated. The impacts at any part of the system will probably be very modest, perhaps
even imperceptible, although Seven Mile may be an exception. After all,
the total amount of electricity involved, and therefore the amount of
manipulation of streamflows required, is very modest. But it should be
recognized that some of B.C. Hydro's proposed projects now in the
planning stage are environmentally controversial, and adding the commitment to Seattle to B.C. Hydro's future generation requirements could
possibly lead to added environmental and political stress."' The current
85. Skagit Victor for Ever'one. Vancouver Province. Apr. 15. 1983. at B2. col. 1.
86. Agreement. supra note 12. § 9 at 8.
87. British Columbia Utility Commission rate hearings. Jan. 1986. reported in 192 CLEARING Up
13 (Jan. 17. 1986) (weekly newsletter for western utilities published by Newsdata Service, Box
9157. Queen Anhe Station. Seattle WA 98109). B.C. Hydro officials, questioned about new resources
for meeting domestic load in addition to the Site C project on the Peace River. which is currentiy
proposed for export of power to the United States. referred to the possibility of a 200 MW powerhouse
at Keenleyside Dam on the Columbia River and also to a dam and powerhouse at the Murphy Creek
site on the Columbia River approximately two miles upstream from Trail. B.C.
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surplus of electricity both in British Columbia and the U.S. Pacific Northwest has produced a truce with the environmentalists but not an armistice.
Flexibilirv and Securit,
The termination option in the Agreement allows future decisionmakers
a degree of flexibility, although their choices are restricted to a few discrete
options as a compromise with security. Flexibility is especially important.
given the lesson of the sharp changes in social values that underlay the
Ross Dam controversy, and the inability to predict long-term energy
requirements and future technological change.
At the other end of the spectrum, the Agreement emphasizes the security
and protection of one party's interests if the other terminates unilaterally.
The termination sections of the Agreement appear to provide that either
party would be no worse off, and perhaps better off, should the other
party choose to terminate the Agreement. Again, as noted above, the
Canadian Skagit could be flooded if British Columbia terminates; the
security provided the Skagit Valley is more conditional than that provided
the two parties to the Agreement.U
Despite the flexibility and security built into the Agreement by the
termination option, an 80-year energy contract involving substantial commitments is inherently risky, and is particularly sensitive to changes in
energy economics. The two parties' exposure to risk changes over time.
and in opposite directions. The Agreement moderates this risk exposure
very even-handedly, but can not eliminate the risk. British Columbia is
exposed to the risk that energy will escalate in value more than anticipated,
facing the province with the choice of providing valuable electricity to
Seattle that could bring greater returns in other markets, or terminating
the contract. But there are disincentives to the termination option. Foremost. British Columbia would take the risk that Seattle would build High
Ross. Also, the province would have to pay Seattle ihe cost of constructing
High Ross should it terminate, and in effect would have provided free
power to Seattle from 1986 to the year of termination. Moreover, the
-returns to British Columbia from investing Seattle's capital payments help
insure the province against increases in the cost of meeting the commitment to Seattle. Finally, British Columbia's access to the very low cost
increment of power resulting from raising Seven Mile Reservoir can be
suspended if the province is in serious default of its obligations to Seattle.
Seattle's exposure to unanticipated changes in the future value of power
runs in the opposite direction: lower-than-expected future value means
that Seattle would have paid too high a price and could have obtained
88. Agreement. supra note 12. §9 at 8: Treaty. supra note 12. Art 11and III at 2.
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equivalent power elsewhere at lower cost. Seattle could meet this issue
by terminating and ceasing to make payment. However, the economic
disincentive to early termination by Seattle is that after the thirty-five
years of annual capital payments, the cost of the contract power drops
to an almost trivial figure. Seattle maximizes its total net benefits only
if the contract runs full-term, despite the fact that it could minimize capital
outlay by early termination. The estimated "crossover year," the first full
year in which High Ross "paper dam" power becomes less expensive to
Seattle than purchasing equivalent power from the Bonneville Power
Administration, is forecast to be about 1997. Over the life of the contract,
the High Ross power is forecast to save Seattle City Light ratepayers
21.1 mills per kilowatt hour delivered (1983 data) compared to purchasing
from Bonneville Power Administration." Thus Seattle's economic incentive to terminate declines over time.
Summing up this discussion of economic risk. Seattle gets expensive
power in the early years but is making a long-term investment in anticipation of future net benefits, exactly as would be the case had it proceeded
with construction of High Ross. On the other hand, British Columbia can
meet its commitment relatively painlessly in the early years because of
its current surplus of generating capacity and the low cost of the Seven
Mile increment, but must shoulder the greater gamble on the future.
Acceptance of future risk is a burden the province has assumed for absolving itself from the 1967 contract and saving the Canadian Skagit
Valley.
It should be noted, however, that the province's future risk is modest
because the commitment to Seattle represents less than one percent of
B.C. Hydro's total generating capacity. To Seattle. conversely, it represents an increment of about three percent in firm baseload energy and
fifteen percent in highly valued peaking capacity.' In short, the economic
incentives for termination versus adhering to the contract are nicely balanced on both sides of the border. regardless of unforeseen changes in
the value of energy.
Beyond the balancing of economic incentives and disincentives are the,
arbitration procedures and the federal guarantees. The arbitration procedures provide a means to adjudicate grievances and award compensation
for damages. The federal guarantees provide the essential "default insurance" which was absent in earlier settlement proposals. The Treaty,
the highest form of a contract between sovereign states, guarantees per89. Seattle City Light. Memorandum to Ray Nelson from Al Yamagiwa. First-Year Cost Impacts
of the High Ross Contract (Mar. 5. 1985) (1983 data).
90. Seattle City Council. Briefing Papers. supra note 2. These figures are 1983 estimates and
vary with each utility's load and resource mix.
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formance or compensation, and makes explicit at the national level the
rights and conditions for operation of the energy contract, the Seven Mile
and Ross, reservoirs, and all variations of the termination option and the
rights of the non-terminating party.
Durability and the Skagit Environment
The durability of the Agreement, of course, controls the fate of the
Canadian Skagit Valley, concern for which triggered the controversy and
ultimately the settlement. As noted, termination of the Agreement by
British Columbia would expose the valley to inundation by High Ross,
and the Agreement and Treaty leave no legal basis for objection should
Seattle elect to exercise its option to construct. In a real sense, the valley
environment is a pawn in the hands of power managers. Fortunately for
the environmental interest, B.C. Hydro is an agency of the Province of
British Columbia, and thus subject to the political process. At present,
it is hard to imagine that the province would ever voluntarily trade the
Skagit Valley for power or money, after having fought a long and fierce
"holy war" for its preservation. Moreover, the changing economics of
outdoor recreation with increasing population pressure and increasing
scarcity value provide a measure of built-in protection. Presumably, too,
the Environmental Endowment Fund will contribute to the valley becoming more than an outdoor recreation area, but rather a very special place,
a symbol of international cooperation with the special values people attach
to such symbols. Certainly the Agreement itself is already a monument
to the international community of environmentalists who vowed fifteen
years earlier to surrender no more of the Skagit to incremental development.
Will the Agreement run its full term and thus preserve the remaining
Canadian Skagit Valley? The question can not be answered with certainty,
of course, and the shifting values that led to breakdown of the 1942 and
1967 decisions encourage caution in hazarding prediction. Nonetheless.
the equitable balancing of incentives and disincentives, of options and
penalties, and the pervasive element of fairness suggest the Agreement
is not only a durable, but also an exemplary instrument.
Finally, it can be argued that the political benefits which accrue invest
the Agreement with enhanced durability. Seattle can claim it won a High
Ross equivalent and that its concession of the dam was a praiseworthy
contribution to preservation of the Skagit environment, thus scoring points
with Seattle citizens, environmentalists, and the U.S. State Department.
British Columbia's prize is control of its Skagit Valley. an important
political objective not only to environmentalists but also to the British
Columbian citizenry as a symbol of the progress that had been achieved
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in making its provincial government more sensitive to its political sentiments regarding natural resource management. The victory appeased
the public's anger and frustration that its provincial government had so
lightly handed over resources for convenient exploitation by its southern
neighbor and bolstered Canadian nationalistic pride as well.
A more subtle, but perhaps more important, benefit to British Columbia
is the opportunity to reestablish its credibility by fulfilling, through the
Agreement, the longstanding obligation of the 1967 contract. This, of
course, will require British Columbia's successful performance over the
period of the Agreement, but it would seem foolhardy for the provincial
government to turn its back on these political benefits and terminate the
Agreement.
A MODEL FOR THE FUTURE
The High Ross Agreement was such an unexpectedly successful conclusion to a longstanding and seemingly intractable controversy that the
observer inevitably looks for general applicability. Some of the procedures
and strategies discussed above are transferable to other situations, but
there were fortuitous changes in the environment surrounding the controversy that could neither be predicted nor produced on command. They
were, simply, serendipitous.
First and foremost of the serendipitous factors was the growing awareness, beginning about 1981. that electricity surplus had replaced shortage
in both British Columbia and the U.S. Pacific Northwest as the fundamental condition of the power planning environment."l Although a negotiated settlement might have been reached regardless. it seemed obvious
during the 1982-83 negotiating period that British Columbia could supply
power to Seattle in exchange for High Ross at little or no opportunity
cost for at least an initial period of several years. By the time the British
Columbia-Seattle Agreement was signed in 1984. the period of surplus
power was being measured in decades, not years. This was reinforced
by another factor- High Ross was to be essentially a peaking power project
and the alternatives available to Seattle for acquiring peaking power were
more expensive despite the general energy surplus in the Pacific Northwest. Thus it had become feasible for British Columbia to provide the
equivalent of High Ross power. at least in the short run, and for Seattle
to compensate British Columbia by an amount of money eqivalent to
High Ross costs. The only alternative market available for British Columbia's surplus was in the southwestern United States, and this is constrained by limitations on B.C. Hydro's access to the Pacific Coast Intertie.
91. See supra note 13.
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A settlement might well have been reached, but no amount of planning
foresight or willingness to negotiate could have created the condition of
complementarity which had arisen.
Another favorable factor that would not be generally applicable was
the availability of Canadian power that was generated at U.S. powerplants
as a result of upstream storage in Canada provided under the terms of
the Columbia River Treaty (1961)."2 The share of the Treaty power to
which British Columbia is entitled was sold to U.S. entities for a thirty
year period dating from completion of each of the three upstream reservoirs, and these contracts begin to expire in the late 1990s. The physical
availability of this power within the boundaries of the United States as
backup security for the High Ross Agreement served to reassure Seattle
of recourse in case of default by British Columbia.
Another favorable, and very site-specific, factor was the existence of
B.C. Hydro's Seven Mile Dam on the Pend Oreille River immediately
downstream from Seattle's Boundary Dam. Seattle Was able to use its
assent to raising Seven Mile as a bargaining chip. At the same time. the
Canadian negotiators could reassure their constituents by pointing to the
availability of increased, and low cost, power output at Seven Mile that
was made possible by Seattle's agreeing to the inundation of its lands.
Both the amounts of incremental power and land to be inundated are
modest, but the point could be made that a concession had been won
from Seattle. Had Boundary Dam and the lands below been controlled
by some other entity, the concession would have been less meaningful
and might not have been possible. Also, as noted, the possible loss of
Seven Mile power provides an incentive for British Columbia to avoid
default.
Somewhat more speculative than the preceding factors were the changes
in the rules of environmental and utility decisionmaking that occurred
during the 1970s in the United States, and Seattle -and SCL were not
insulated from these changes. The National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) with its environmental impact statement and public participation
requirements was passed in 1969."' In addition, open meeting and administrative procedure laws led to changes in administrative behavioras it had generally affected public resource decisionmakin" in the United
States--that moved decisionmaking into the public arena and broadened
the agenda of debate and the range of alternatives considered. Utility
managers had to defend proposals before increasingly sophisticated and
skeptical publics. In the electrical utility field the ethic of "utility re92. See supra note 64.
93. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Pub. L. 91-190 §§204 & 205. 83 Stat. 852
(codified at42 U.S.C. §4321 etseq.. (1976)).
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sponsibility" which meant to provide capacity to meet all load growth,
coupled with an unshakable faith in the price inelasticity of power demand, had dominated decisions for decades. In the 1970s this was challenged by the rising ethic of conservation and environmental protection.
In the Pacific Northwest, the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning
and Conservation Act of 1980 " was a very different piece of legislation
from the earlier versions that had been designed and sponsored by utility
leaders of the region. The difference reflected a fundamental shift in
values, a lessening of the prestige of utility technocrats, and an ascendancy
of the politician's skills in seeking accommodation among competing
interests."
In Seattle the shift in values had led in 1976 to a decision of the City
Council to override the recommendation of SCL to acquire a ten percent
interest in the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) nuclear
plants 4 and 5. The Council's decision was based in part on a citizensponsored study, Energy 1990, which advocated conservation of electricity as an alternative to acquiring new generating capacity.' The subsequent problems of WPPSS demonstrated that electricity demand was
indeed responsive to price. The termination of plants 4 and 5. which
created the largest municipal bond default in U.S. financial history, validated the Council's decision against participating in the two projects and
strengthened the hand of the public and the political decisionmaking
apparatus in dealing with utility technocrats. It was the first time in modem
history that a major recommendation of SCL had been rejected by the
City Council. The reciprocal was that meeting future load growth became
a shared concern of SCL, the Council, and, to some extent, the involved
public. Although the WPPSS 4 and 5 decision did not directly involve
High Ross, it conveyed the message that political leaders could make
decisions on grounds other than engineering and economics. Neither
Seattle nor British Columbia officially abandoned their positions until the
negotiated settlement was reached, but there appeared to be a subtle shift
from a focus on the legal issues to the possibility of a negotiated solution.9'
Although the climate for a successful settlement had improved because
of unanticipated and uncontrollable factors not directly connected to the
High Ross case, there are lessons from it that have more general appli94. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act. Pub. L. 96-501. 94 Stat.
2697 (codified at 16 U.S.C. 839 et seq. (1980)).
95. U.S. Dept. of Energy. Legislative History of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning
and Conservation Act. prepared by BPA Library. Portland OR. 1981. See also H. Rep. 96-976. Pt.
1 (Interior) and H. Rep. 96-976. Pt. I (Commerce). See also K. LEE & D. Ki.E.'4KA. with M. MARTS.
ELECrRIC POWER AND THE FUTURE OF THE PACIFiC NoRTHWEST ch. V (1980).
96. Sugai. The WNP 4 & 5 Participation Decision: Seattle and Tacoma--a Tale of Two Cities. I
NoRTHWEsT E'NWL 1.45 (1984).
97. Gibson. The Evolution of the High Ross Dam Settlement, 2 NORThwEsT E.VT'L J.I (1985).
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cability for the participants, planners, and environmental activists. One
important lesson is to expect unexpected change. There should not be
open-ended, unlimited term agreements. Course correction can be provided by building in requirements for periodic re-examination, sunset
clauses, and re-opening provisions. Such conditions are not compatible
with large capital investments, such as Ross Dam, but adjustments to
them may be less costly than lengthy controversy. Seattle, relying on the
1942 order, incurred substantial costs in building Ross Dam to accommodate the fourth step. Had the Order provided for periodic re-examination or been for a certain period, Seattle would have planned and
constructed differently, or at least anticipated the possibility of sunk costs.
The 1967 compensation agreement was anachronistic from the outset.
Not only had the environmental movement become a force by then, but
the earlier negotiation of the Columbia River Treaty made it clear that
equitable apportionment of benefits and costs was the preferred underlying
principle for shared international ventures." Despite the Treaty experience, the 1967 agreement was based on the value of the land to be
inundated rather than a sharing of the benefits, and with no provision for
periodic re-evaluation even of the value of the land. True, British Columbia had the option to take the rental payments in power rather than
cash but the basis of the power option was land rent rather than equitable
sharing of benefits. Sharing the output of High Ross could have been
based on some proportioning of the storage and head provided on the
Canadian side of the border. Somewhere the principle of equitable apportionment that led to the 1961 Columbia River Treaty was lost in
negotiating the 1967 Agreement between British Columbia and Seattle.
The UC should retain jurisdiction over all international agreements subsidiary to its basic orders, such as the 1967 agreement, in order to keep
such derivative agreements consonant with changes in international comity.
But no modification in international decisionmaking procedures would
have prevented the environmental storm that arose in the late 1960s.
Seattle City Light managers, confident in the correctness of their High
Ross position, appeared to have underestimated the strength of the environmentalists' position from the outset, and sought to meet environmental criticisms with a "father knows best" response. The environmentalists
were not interested in compromise, nor in arguments about peaking versus
other kinds of electricity or reduced reservoir drawdown, which SCL
advanced in vain. The position of the environmentalists was clear and
straightforward: no High Ross dam. Moderates'who viewed High Ross
98. Johnson, The Canada-United States Controversy Over the Columbia River. 41 WASH. L. REv.
676. 758 (1966).
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as less environmentally damaging than possible alternatives were quickly
driven from-the field." During the long debate, the environmentalists had
come to mistrust Seattle City Light. 100
Thus, SCL's protestations that the vertical drawdowns of the High
Ross reservoir would be substantially less than existing drawdowns (55

feet vs. 122 feet), and that the reservoir shorelands would be groomed
carefully for aesthetic enhancement, fell on deaf ears. Communication
between environmentalists and SCL approached zero. With Seattle-based
and Vancouver-based environmentalists linked, the project and the credibility of the utility were in deeper trouble than proponents, guided by
engineering and economic logic, recognized.' 0 ' There were some possible
compromises that SCL could have offered, such as iron-clad guarantees
to reduce the vertical drawdown, to hold the reservoir full during the
summer recreation season, and to groom the shorelands and the seasonally
exposed mudflats and stump "'farms." SCL might also have agreed to
forego construction of the proposed Copper Creek Dam downstream from
Gorge Dam, a project that would have been destructive of salmon-spawning habitat, bald eagles dependent on the spawned-out salmon, and the
remaining white-water recreation on the Skagit River. But SCL was unable
to convince environmentalists of its good intentions with respect to the
first two points, and apparently unwilling to bargain away the Copper
Creek option. The creation of an Environmental Affairs Division within
SCL's bureaucratic structure was both too little and too late.
The case is a good example of a bureaucracy's failure to communicate
on the basis of mutual respect and confidence with an underestimated
constituency. The final chapter of the effect of environmental opposition
to High Ross has not been written, but there is no question that the delay
clearly helped to move the final decision from the era of development to
the era of environmental protection. The lesson for bureaucracy is clear:
environmentalists and other publics must be brought sincerely and openly
into the planning process early, not for cooption. but for conscientious
consideration of alternative views and possibilities. In hindsight, it is
unfortunate that the formula of citizen participation in Seattle's WPPSS
4 and 5 decision was not also applied in the High Ross case. A municipal
utility is a branch of government, and government must remain accessible
and open to all responsible citizen input.
99. Personal experience of author MM. former member of the Board of the North Cascades
Conservation Council (N3C).
100. See. e.g.. Beck. The Incredible Ross Dam Story. WuLD CASCADES 5 (Aug.-Sept. 1970)
(bulletin of the North Cascades Conservation Council). Most issues of this bulletin during the early
and mid-1970s carried articles and editorials critical of the High Ross project and SCL. conveying
the feelings of environmentalists in no uncertain terms.
101. Lane. supra note 5.
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There are also lessons for the environmentalists. In the Skagit case,
they were able to take advantage of political events such as passage of
the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act and the Skagit issue's attainment of unusual significance, which repeatedly forestalled a High
Ross decision and allowed environmentalists to buy time. Fate may not
be so generous in every case. But for the changing environment of negotiation and its different personalities, a settlement satisfactory to the
environmentalists might not have been reached. The Ross Dam decision
should probably be considered more a victory for skillful political negotiation than for confrontational environmental politics, although confrontation did force both delay and review. In the end, foregoing High
Ross Dam was the outcome sought by environmentalists, and the Environmental Endowment Fund and the promise it holds for enhancing the
existing reservoir environment is clearly a victory, and no small one.
CONCLUSION
Construction of Ross Dam commenced in 1938 and conformed to the
values of that time. Likewise, the settlement reached in 1983 conformed
to the values of the new environmental ethic that arose in the 1960s.
Least-cost electricity-and whatever economic development it might have
fostered-was no longer the highest good. The early planners could not
have foreseen the change in social values wrought by the environmental
movement or that environmental values would take a place alongside
conventional priorities.
The Skagit controversy was a political conflict. Although many legal
issues were raised and thoroughly examined, it was not a legal conflict.
It was an environmental conflict only in the sense that High Ross Reservoir
was inconsistent with environmentalists' preferences. This in itself would
have been insufficient cause to devise an elaborate agreement and treaty,
and the scale of the High Ross impacts pales in importance compared to
such transboundary environmental problems as acid rain or Great Lakes
water quality.
At the heart of the political conflict lay matters of principle. Seattle
expected, with justification, that one*way or another, British Columbia
should live up to its 1967 commitment. The province expected Seattle
to be sensitive to its legitimate political dilemma and grant special consideration. Over time, the international dimension greatly compounded
these issues, and without the successful intervention by the IJC, the
elected officials in British Columbia and Seattle were unable to transcend
the narrow purview of their own interests.
The LIC might have imposed arbitration. Instead, it required the two
participants to hammer out a settlement. making their own painful trade-
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offs and maximizing their gains wherever possible. Instead of an imposed
settlement, which might have caused more friction, British Columbia and
Seattle are now able to live with their own Agreement, and with an
understanding of the many limiting technical, economic, and political
constraints embedded in it. In fact, the two parties may have maximized
their separate interests; if so, the Agreement has achieved Pareto optimality-neither
one could be made better off without making the other
02
worse off.
The High Ross solution is an example of conflict resolution at its best.
The fact that certain fortuitous changes had occurred in the external
environment does not detract from the skill, commitment, and efforts of
the negotiators, nor from the UC for its perceptivity in recognizing the
possibilities offered by the changed environment and the willingness to
risk an unconventional approach.
The Agreement was the right solution at the right time. All three sides
of the controversy won: British Columbia, Seattle, and the environmental
community. And a corrosive factor in the relationship between Canada
and the United States has been removed.

102. Testing this possibility is beyond the scope of this article, but the authors suggest that such
a test would be a useful research project.

